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Abstract	  
This	  article	  will	  address	   theories	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	   the	  public	   sphere	  and	  
government	   communication,	   and	   will	   investigate	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   government	  
communication	   might	   be	   carried	   out	   to	   strengthen	   and	   improve	   deliberative	  
democracy,	   within	   the	   wider	   context	   of	   journalism.	   Specifically,	   this	   article	   will	  
begin	   by	   undertaking	   an	   extended	   survey	   of	   the	   normative	   model	   of	   the	   public	  
sphere,	  as	  outlined	  by	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  and	  will	  take	  account	  of	  his	  later	  work	  on	  
the	  centrality	  of	   the	  deliberative	  process	   to	   the	  public	   sphere.	   In	   the	   second	  half,	  
this	  article	  will	  apply	  Held’s	  conceptions	  to	  the	  role	  of	  government	  communication	  
in	  the	  strengthening	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  and	  will	  attempt	  to	  make	  normative	  
arguments	  about	  certain	   forms	  of	  government	  communication.	   In	  doing	  so,	   it	  will	  
address	   three	   areas:	   the	   problems	   with	   the	   standing	   “lobby”	   system	   of	   briefing	  
journalists	   in	   the	  UK;	  ways	   in	  which	  government	  communication	  might	  be	  held	   to	  
greater	  account	  in	  the	  public	  sphere;	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  improved	  communication	  of	  
Parliament	  might	  impact	  upon	  deliberative	  democracy.	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Journalism, Deliberative Democracy and Government Communication: normative 
arguments from public sphere theory 
 
 
 This article will address theories of deliberative democracy, the public sphere and 
government communication, and will investigate the ways in which government 
communication might be carried out to strengthen and improve deliberative democracy, 
within the wider context of journalism. Specifically, this article will begin by undertaking 
an extended survey of the normative model of the public sphere, as outlined by Jürgen 
Habermas, and will take account of his later work on the centrality of the deliberative 
process to the public sphere. In the second half, this article will apply Held’s conceptions 
to the role of government communication in the strengthening of deliberative democracy, 
and will attempt to make normative arguments about certain forms of government 
communication. In doing so, it will address three areas: the problems with the standing 
“lobby” system of briefing journalists in the UK; ways in which government 
communication might be held to greater account in the public sphere; ways in which the 
improved communication of Parliament might impact upon deliberative democracy. This 
article will argue that the configuration between journalism, government communication 
and deliberative democracy is crucial in the type of public sphere that results, and that 
accordingly normative arguments ought to be forwarded on how this configuration 
functions.  
 
 The term “deliberative democracy” was first used in 1980 by Joseph Bessette, 
following the “theoretical critique of liberal democracy and revival of participatory 
politics gradually developed through the 1970s” (Bohman and Rehg 1997, xii). Despite 
research on deliberative democracy per se being a relatively recent phenomenon, a large 
body of work has developed in a short space of time. In particular, Dahlgren holds to 
what we might call the central account of deliberative democracy, arguing in a 
deliberative model “that the reasons should be made accessible to all concerned; this 
means not only that they should in some manner be made public, but also be 
comprehensible” (2009, 87). However, despite so many clear benefits to the model of 
deliberative democracy, Dahlgren identifies some problems, not wanting to “overload the 
role we expect deliberation to play in the public sphere” (2009, 88). Bohman (with 
William Rehg), understands deliberative democracy as being evocative of “rational 
legislation, participatory politics, and civic self-governance” (1997, ix). Writing 
individually, Bohman maintains the position that deliberative democracy is a normative 
conception, to be governed by a set of clear principles: “Deliberation is democratic, to the 
extent that it is based on a process of reaching reasoned agreement among free and equal 
citizens. This conception of democratic deliberation also implies a normative ideal of 
political justification, according to which each citizen’s reasons must be given equal 
concern and consideration for a decision to be legitimate” (1997, 321). Bohman moves to 
outlining three models of Deliberative democracy, namely: Pre commitment (agreeing to 
“defined public agenda”); Proceduralist (which “avoids making overly strong and 
substantive assumptions about agreement among citizens”); Dialogical (in dialogue 
“many diverse capacities for deliberation are exercised jointly”) (1996, 25). Bohman 
argues that it is the latter model, based on deliberation with “whom we disagree and with 
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others who are not literally present before us” that holds the most weight (1996, 24). 
Indeed, for Bohman deliberative democracy ought to be “interpersonal” between citizens 
who are “equally empowered and authorized to participate in decisions that affect their 
lives together” (1996, 25).  
 
 Cohen takes a normative approach in arguing that deliberative democracy involves 
“a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among 
equal citizens - by providing favourable conditions for participation, association and 
expression” (1997a, 413). He also argues for a four-fold model that states deliberation 
should be (i) free, (ii) based on reason, (iii) equitable and (iv) have consensus as the 
overall outcome (1997b, 74). Similarly, Benhabib (1996) is concerned with the normative 
principles that ought to underpin deliberative democracy. For her, the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions increases as deliberation improves, stating that this occurs when 
“decisions are in principle open to appropriate public processes of deliberation by free 
and equal citizens” (1996, 69). Similarly, Young asserts that the manner in which 
deliberation occurs is fundamental to the very process of deliberative democracy itself. 
One of her main problems with much of deliberative democracy theory, is that 
“Deliberative theorists tend to assume that bracketing political and economic power is 
sufficient to make speakers equal” (1996, 122). However, she posits that many factors 
render this bracketing insufficient; economic dependence, political domination, sense of 
the right to speak, valuation or devaluation of speech styles, are factors which all might 
hamper equality.  
 
 Like Cohen, Benhabib and Young, Fishkin (2009a) is also concerned with the 
theoretical underpinnings of deliberative democracy, arguing  that people are ill 
informed, and it is hard to motive people to become informed, due to the problem of 
“rational ignorance”. However, Fishkin mobilises the concept through what he calls 
“deliberative polling” (1995, 2009a, 2009b), a process which results in a combination of 
“political equality with deliberation” (2009b, 26). This process, pioneered by Fishkin 
himself, follows a simple plan. It involves bringing a large cross-section of a particular 
constituency together, polling the participants of a range of issues, allowing them to 
debate, discuss and draw on a range of experts. At the end of the process, the participants 
are polled again, on the same questions. Fishkin and his team, who partner with 
democratic civil society groups, have consistently found that views shift considerably 
following deliberative polling. In October 2007, Fishkin put “Europe in one room” (by 
bringing together a representative sample from across the EU), the results of which are 
discussed in When the People Speak (2009a, 183-189): he found that there was real 
commonality in the issues faced by people from all of Europe’s states, and increased 
understanding of the role of the EU. However, such exercises are inevitably expensive, 
with larger polls costing hundreds of thousands and indeed millions of pounds. However, 
the benefits to deliberative polling are clear, with Fishkin consistently finding large shifts 
of opinion from the before to the after. For example, he ‘found in a referendum in 
Australia and in a general election in Britain that when a scientific sample became more 
informed and really discussed the issues, it changed its voting intentions significantly’ 
(2009a, 8).  
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Theoretical underpinnings: the public sphere 
 
 Whilst deliberative democracy as a term originates from 1980, its theoretical 
underpinnings can be derived from Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere 
(Habermas 1989, 1996, 1997). The very notion of improving the quality of democratic 
decision making based upon debate and consensus is foundational to the Habermasian 
project. Deliberative democracy can be considered an analogous category of what occurs 
in the public sphere. In a similar way to public sphere theory, a detailed theoretical 
position is set out by various theorists, usually in normative terms. In a similar vein to the 
centre of the normative Habermasian model of the public sphere, “Deliberation can 
overcome the limitations of private views and enhance the quality of public decision-
making for a number of reasons” (Held 2006, 237). Turning to Habermas’s model of the 
public sphere to frame this discussion provides the researcher with a rich intellectual well 
from which to make normative arguments. Under the terms that Habermas sets out, the 
public sphere is carved out between the state and the private sphere, and is a domain in 
which citizens may hold the state to account through “rational-critical” debate. However, 
the public sphere in the UK and in most western mass democracies cannot be recognised 
according to the conditions by which Habermas lays down for it. Rather it is a poor 
reflection of the bourgeois model proposed by Habermas in Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere (1989), an argument that he takes back up later in his later writing 
(1992, 1996, 2006, 2009). To this end, the public sphere is an ideal, rather than a reality. 
Like many other theorists, Manuel Castells (2008) argues for this position, insisting that 
there is normative value in using the public sphere as a critical category (see also 
Garnham 1992; Scannell 2007). Referring to Habermas, Castells suggests “the terms of 
the political equation he proposed remain a useful intellectual construct—a way of 
representing the contradictory relationships between the conflictive interests of social 
actors, the social construction of cultural meaning, and the institutions of the state” (2008, 
80).  
 
 Habermas argues that the main reasons for the break down in the ideal-type public 
sphere are the commercialisation of media and the dissipation of public discourse, a 
historical shift that he calls “refeudalisation” (1989). As media have become more 
commercialised, they have become more subservient to the market, and have become 
increasingly less committed to the stimulation of a public discourse. Rather 
commercialisation has led to an exponential rise in entertainment, and infomercial based 
content, at the expense of political journalism, current affairs journalism, and 
investigative reporting (Habermas 2006). Increasingly journalists attempt to understand 
politics through a lens of celebrity and personality, with party leaders in the UK 
clambering to be seen as in touch with the public. However, at the heart of a properly 
functioning public sphere is a press which stimulates debate, holds politicians and 
governments to account, and which functions to facilitate a flow of political information 
to the public sphere. Based on this information, the public sphere functions as a site for 
the production of public opinion, which feeds back into the media system through 
polling, and which impact upon the state through voting.  
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 Using the Habermasian theory of the public sphere to contextualise this article has a 
certain strong rationale to it, given Habermas’s later explicit focus on the role of 
deliberative democracy in the public sphere. Haas (1999) states that whilst Habermas is 
seen as one of the key proponents of deliberative democracy, he is accepted into this role 
somewhat uncritically; for example, in the case of Lambeth calling Habermas the “patron 
saint” of public journalism. Nevertheless, Habermas significantly informs the genre 
(Haas 1999, 346-347).  Primarily, through the priority given to “deliberation” on political 
issues, of public value and importance, democratic differences are subject to reason and 
debate. Akin to how deliberation ought to operate in the Habermasian public sphere, it is 
through “through the force of better argument” and not through higher economic or social 
class, or dominance in terms of physical force, that citizens should gain influence (Edgar 
2006, 124). The primacy of the theory of deliberative democracy, as constitutive of the 
Habermasian public sphere, is thus fundamental to its operation. This position is 
reenforced by Habermas in his some of his later work (2006, 2009).  
 
 Habermas suggests that a model of politics based on deliberation “is supposed to 
generate legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will-formation that grants: 
publicity and transparency for the deliberative process; inclusion and equal opportunity 
for participation and a justified presumption for reasonable outcomes” (2006, 4). Such a 
deliberative process, he argues, is already built into the everyday forms of 
communication that we all undertake. In the course of every day, we listen to rational 
utterances, and weigh up their veracity; we are all interlocuters in the public sphere. On 
the question of deliberative democracy influencing the political process, Habermas states 
that this question is very much an empirical one. Drawing on research which shows that 
deliberation leads to more informed political choices, and less polarised viewpoints, he 
outlines the clear deliberative model in relation to the public sphere: “There is empirical 
evidence for an impact of deliberation on decision-making processes in national 
legislatures and in other political institutions as there is for the learning effects of 
ruminating political conversations among citizens in every-day life” (2006, 10). 
 
 To further develop the connection between deliberative democracy and journalism, 
I want to now address the role that Habermas sees for journalism in relation to the public 
sphere. Initially outlined and developed extensively in Structural Transformation in the 
Public Sphere, Habermas provides more rigorous and illustrative detail in his later work 
(1996, 2006). In one conception, Habermas posits that the public sphere is a fluid space: 
“Just as little does it represent a system; although it permits one to draw internal 
boundaries, outwardly it is characterised by open, permeable and shifting horizons” 
(1996, 360). These shifting horizons are in part directed and moved by journalists, who 
are mostly responsible for “wild flows of messages – news, reports, commentaries, talks, 
scenes and images, shows and movies with an informative, polemical, educational or 
entertaining content” (2006, 11-12). Having been fed (often highly mediated) positions 
on many subjects and issues from politicians, lobbyists, and civil society actors, 
journalists operating in the media system, “produce an elite discourse” (2006, 14-15). 
Despite much hyperbole surrounding the role of the Internet, Web 2.0 and citizen 
journalism, this article will proceed on the assertion that it is still the professional media 
system still holds the centre ground of the public sphere.  
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 These multiple actors then, with journalists in the media system making up the 
substantial core, “join in the construction of what we call “public opinion”, though this 
singular phrase only refers to the prevailing one among many public opinions” (2006, 14-
15). Indeed, in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas submits to the by now prevailing 
position that public spheres, like public opinions, are multiple: he argues, “The streams of 
communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that they 
coalesce into bundles of totally specified public opinions” (1996, 360).i 
 These public opinions, of course, are not static; rather, they are constantly changing, 
under the influence of “every-day talk in the informal settings or episodic publics of civil 
society at least as much as they are by paying attention to print or electronic media” 
(2006, 11-12). The latter part of this - the differing level of attention that is given to 
media - is fundamental for three reasons, and illustrative of my central argument. Firstly, 
the mediatisation of almost every level of society means that the public is largely 
saturated by media exposure; secondly, given the nature of the refeudalised public sphere, 
the opportunities for discussion of matters of a substantial political matter are limited, or 
at any rate, not utilised; thirdly, what opportunities interlocuters do have, are limited by 
the lack of quality or substantive political material to discuss, given the over-riding focus 
on infotainment and entertainment in most of the mainstream media. 
 
 With advanced market liberalisation in the media sector in the UK, few news 
outlets stand outside of the market. The most major exception is of course the BBC, 
whilst the Guardian newspaper which is operated by a not-for-profit trust, is an anomaly. 
Thus, according to normative public sphere theory, the ability of the public sphere to 
operate in the way it normatively ought to, is severely diminished. As media outlets have 
become more commercialised, and have become more subservient to market logic, they 
have become increasingly less committed to the stimulation of a public discourse, and to 
the reporting of political matters of public importance. One of the major implications of 
this is that the reporting of government policy remains far from the type of detailed 
reporting that one might expect in a properly functioning public sphere. As governments 
become subject to diminishing levels of critical publicity, and serious in-depth political 
analysis, citizens have diminishing access to political information, upon which to base 
their political decisions. This chimes with John Thompson, who states that “the 
commercialisation of mass communication progressively destroyed its character as a 
medium of the public sphere, for the content of newspapers and other products was 
depoliticised, personalised and sensationalised” (1990, 113). 
 
 Writing some four and a half decades after he forwarded his theory of the public 
sphere, Habermas in a paper to the International Communication Association (2006), 
remains true to his primacy of the normative value of the public sphere. To Habermas, 
the contemporary public sphere is in flux. He argues that given the drive for profit that 
media corporations are subject to under market logic, serious political content that the 
public sphere requires is margainalised: “Issues of political discourse become assimilated 
into and absorbed by the modes and contents of entertainment. Besides personalization, 
the dramatization of events, the simplification of complex matters, and the vivid 
polarization of conflicts promotes civic privatism and a mood of anti- politics” (2006, 26-
27). To compound this situation further, public broadcasting - which does operate with a 
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different logic, is being eroded; its loss, he argues, “would rob us of the centerpiece of 
deliberative politics” (2006, 27). That political public sphere that does remain, is 
“dominated by the kind of mediated communication that lacks the defining features of 
deliberation”, with a shortfall in “face-to-face interaction between present participants in 
a shared practice of collective decision-making” and the “lack of reciprocity between the 
roles of speakers and addressees in an egalitarian exchange of claims and opinions” 
(2006, 8-9).  
 
 
Normative arguments from Deliberative Democracy theory 
 
 It is to Held, and his analysis of deliberative democracy, in Models of Democracy 
(2006), that I now want to turn to. For Held the key objective of deliberative democracy 
“is the transformation of private preferences via a process of deliberation into positions 
that can withstand public scrutiny and test” (2006, 237). His conception of deliberative 
democracy is instructive here as he frames his conception in public sphere terms. In 
particular, he addresses the role of personality driven politics in a media saturated 
environment. Referring to the growing instrumentalism of the political process, he 
argues: “The policy process has been invaded by opinion polling, focus groups and other 
marketing tools designed to adjust policy to extant views and interests rather than to 
explore the principles underpinning policy and to deliberate over policy direction” (2006, 
234). Moreover, the public sphere is “undermined by the reliance of elites and parties on 
opinion poll data, which they are free to interpret and manipulate in their own interests” 
(2006, 234-235). Here we see how Held takes account of the same shifts in the political 
process that Habermas takes account of, in his “refeudalisation” thesis (1989). 
Encompassing this thesis, we can chart the shift to a public sphere where the public 
opinion that it generates, is harnessed for improved political positioning at the expense of 
policy development. The strengthening of links to the spheres of advertising and 
marketing has become the most prevalent development here, and for a few decades now 
the influence of advertising executives in politics has been considerable (see Gould 
1998). 
 
 Whilst Habermas’s theory of the public sphere frames this article, it is Held’s 
understanding of Deliberative Democracy that I want to mobilise for the following three 
categories of analysis. Moving from Habermas to Held is not contradictory, but is rather 
complementary in this context. Where Habermas sets the broad theoretical context for 
deliberative democracy through his exposition of the public sphere, Held provides solid 
imperatives. The three imperatives that I want to draw on from his work are the 
normative arguments that: 
 
• “Sharing information and pooling knowledge, public deliberation can 
transform individuals’ understanding and enhance their grasp of complex 
problems” (2006, 237) 
• “deliberation can expose one sidedness and partiality of certain viewpoints 
which may fail to represent the interests of the many” (2006, 237). 
• “Deliberation may enhance collective judgement because it is concerned not 
	   8	  
just with pooling information and exchanging views, but also with reasoning 
about these and testing arguments” (2006, 238).  
 
On the first, Held suggests that the deliberative process leads to better informed 
individuals, where they “may come to understand elements of their situation which they 
had not appreciated before: for example, aspects of the interrelation of public issues, or 
some of the consequences of taking particular courses of action, intended or otherwise” 
(2006, 237). Through the process of sharing information and pooling knowledge, 
individuals become better placed to make informed, reasoned and rational decisions. On 
the second, Held suggests “public deliberation can reveal how certain preference 
formations may be linked to sectional interests” (2006, 237). Thus, deliberative 
democracy is grounded in the notion that democracy ought to benefit the many, not the 
few. In this sense, it can be called egalitarian, in a similar way that the normative 
Habermasian public sphere is in principle open to all (Habermas 1997: 105). On the third, 
arguing for deliberative democracy leads proponents of the theory to “hope to strengthen 
the legitimacy of democratic procedures and institutions by embracing deliberative 
elements, elements designed to expand the quality of democratic life and enhance 
democratic outcomes” (2006, 238). Thus, research on deliberative democracy ought to try 
to identify where these improvements might be made.  
 
 This article will contend that these three points are conditions of deliberative 
democracy that journalism can help enable, contingent on a certain type of government 
communication. On each point I will recommend how government communication - 
primarily to journalists - might help bring about these conditions. I will turn to each of 
Held’s points, and will recommend how on the part of government, as they communicate 
to journalists, the strengthening deliberative democracy might be improved. In one sense, 
government cannot in real terms be responsible for what is reported. This is indeed a 
point that Habermas makes himself, arguing “even governments do not generally have 
any control over how the media convey and interpret their messages, or even how 
political elites or the broader public receive and react to them” (2009, 170). However, 
government can be responsible at least for the communication that emanates from the 
various organs of the state, and can ensure that communication is carried out in a way 
that is conducive to deliberative democracy. In this respect, I will refer to government 
communication from its central departments, and in the third point, refer to the 
communication of Parliament, on the basis that in the UK system it is government that 
can have massive influence over the affairs of the legislature.  
 
 
Sharing information and pooling knowledge, public deliberation can transform 
individuals’ understanding and enhance their grasp of complex problems 
 
 
 With regards to government communication, public deliberation on the affairs of 
government is a central part of deliberative democracy, and an important underpinning 
factor of the public sphere. For deliberation to function successfully, the type of 
communication that comes from government will be formative upon the process. The 
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main way that government shares information and pools knowledge with the public, is 
through communication that it has with journalists.  In the UK, this primarily happens 
through “the Lobby”, the privileged group of journalists that meets with the Prime 
Minister’s Spokesperson twice daily (during the Parliamentary sessions). In 2008 there 
were 176 members, mostly working for the national broadcast media and newspapers 
(HL Paper 7 2009, 21). Many smaller news outlets and regional journalists are excluded. 
The meeting of the lobby is now constitutes an attributable briefing (changed from the 
previous unattributable policy), but the only access the public and non-lobby journalists 
have to the proceedings comes in the form of a brief summary posted on the Number Ten 
website. The Phillis review in 2004 had reported that “Both government and the media 
have seen their credibility damaged by the impression that they are involved in a closed, 
secretive and opaque insider process” (2004, 25). It is perhaps the presence and role of 
the lobby that probably best underpins this impression. The Lords Communication Report 
(2009) on Government communication suggested that the standing lobby system of 
privileging information to certain journalists in a segregated manner, should be 
abandoned, and that instead media briefings should be available to all online (HL Paper 7 
2009, 22). 
 
 However, despite this clear recommendation, the lobby system has remained in 
place. In its response to the report, the government argued: 
 
The role of the Prime Minister’s Spokesperson is fundamentally different to that of 
the President’s spokesperson in the United States where a named and filmed 
spokesperson is filmed and can handle political questions. The Prime Minister’s 
Spokesperson is a career civil servant who cannot handle political questions. His 
role is to inform and update the lobby on Government business. (HM Government, 
2009) 
 
Whilst there are fundamental differences between the two political systems, concessions 
ought to be made by the UK government if the system of secrecy is to be abolished. 
Indeed, the rationale provided for not allowing a civil servant to handle political 
questions involves evoking a false dichotomy between political and non-political subject 
matter. To suggest that the Prime Minister’s Spokesperson is ever answering questions on 
the business of government, in a manner devoid of political content, seems a 
contradiction in terms. Rather, enacting the recommendation to abolish the lobby system 
may lead to the development and improvement of deliberative democracy. Rather than 
government information being primarily communicated to an exclusive group of 
journalists, it could be placed firmly in the public domain. Rather than journalists have a 
premium on what they report regarding government, and rather than them having 
predominance over the way the affairs of government are interpreted, the public would 
have much wider and better access to government communication.  
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Deliberation can expose one sidedness and partiality of certain viewpoints  
 
 In respect of government communication, for one sidedness and partiality of certain 
viewpoints to be exposed, interlocutors need to be able to rely on factually correct 
information from government on which to base their deliberations. Whilst information 
coming from government will only form a part of deliberation within the wider public 
sphere, a certain type of government information will go a long way to improving 
deliberation within a public sphere. The obvious implication here is that government 
ought to thus only communicate in a way that is truthful and accurate. As an aspiration 
this is normatively desirable under the terms of the public sphere; as a reality this is 
practically very difficult to implement, nigh impossible. However, as this article has 
adopted a methodological framework of normative theory, the underpinning rationale of 
deliberative democracy, it is beneficial to theorise as to how government might be 
institutionally required to communicate in an honest and factual manner. Government 
ought to be absolutely clear and honest about its policies, including who they benefit and 
who they disadvantage. Discarding spin for positive presentation, welds the government 
to a manner of communicating which may help restore credibility in government 
communications, and may help restore the breakdown in trust between politicians, the 
media and the public. “Honesty” - in relation to government communication - could be 
seen as improbable concept. However, here I am referring not to subjective notions of 
honesty, but those which may come from institutional rigour and regulation.  
 
 Moving government along a continuum, towards some sense of honesty, may be 
possible under certain conditions. Turning to the House of Lords report again, it set out a 
normative standard of how governments ought to communicate, stating: “One of the most 
important tasks of government is to provide clear, truthful and factual information to 
citizens. The accurate and impartial communication of information about government 
polices, activities and services is critical to the democratic process” (HL Paper 7 2009, 7). 
The regulation of government to ensure that “spinning” information is avoided may be 
achieved by various forms of regulation, where the establishment of the UK Statistics 
Authority is perhaps a key example of how this may be achieved. The UK SA, 
established in April 2008, “is an independent body operating at arm's length from 
government as a non-ministerial department, directly accountable to Parliament […] 
The Authority's statutory objective is to promote and safeguard the production and 
publication of official statistics that serve the public good. It is also required to promote 
and safeguard the quality and comprehensiveness of official statistics, and ensure good 
practice in relation to official statistics” (UK Statistics Authority, 2009). In order to 
achieve further structural impartiality, and to emphasise it’s “arms-length” status, the 
“budget has been set outside the normal Spending Review process” (UK Statistics 
Authority 2009).  
 
 A body such as the UK SA, occurring in any liberal democracy, can subject 
government to a rigorous assessment of the information that it communicates. 
Deliberative democracy, where information that deliberators can better trust and accept as 
factual, will accordingly be strengthened. Yet, bodies such as UK SA should not have to 
burden the regulation of government communication alone. A healthy public sphere, 
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where interlocutors expose actors such as government to “rational criticism”, will also be 
involved in this job. To enable this, government must place as much information in the 
public domain as possible. Indeed the New Labour government, in March 2010, began to 
move in this direction, by promising to place much more government data in the public 
domain than was previously the case. The recent setup of data.gov.uk, showed the 
government’s drive in this direction. The website states, “We’re very aware that there are 
more people like you outside of government who have the skills and abilities to make 
wonderful things out of public data. These are our first steps in building a collaborative 
relationship with you” (HM Government 2010). Moreover, the employment of Sir Tim 
Berners-Lee and Professor Nigel Shadbolt, showed the government is clearly here trying 
to improve the relationship between the state and the citizen. Perhaps, unknowingly, it is 
improving the conditions for deliberative democracy. Moreover, initiatives such as the 
Datablog on the Guardian website show clearly the results that this kind of activity can 
have (Guardian 2010). Users are encouraged to take raw data, investigate and interrogate 
it, and to submit their findings back to the Guardian, often in the form of visualising data.  
 
 
Deliberation may enhance collective judgement  
 
 When making normative arguments on deliberative democracy and the public 
sphere, it is perhaps the UK Parliament that can be looked upon as an ideal-type model 
(or microcosm) of how a public sphere can be modeled. Davis (2009) outlined this 
argument, stating that “as a system, the UK parliament is very much oriented around 
public sphere ideals in both its institutional formation and the cultural norms and values 
adopted by the politicians within” (2009, 289). Discussing Parliament as an ideal-type 
public sphere model is not unproblematic. Clearly, there are many ways in which 
Parliament does not function well as a public sphere; not least with regards to its 
problematic nature of not being very representative of the British public. However, it 
stands as a normatively important model of the public sphere, as one that embodies the 
formal principles of deliberative democracy. This article will proceed on the contention 
that deliberative democracy might be strengthened if the affairs of Parliament are better 
communicated and disseminated. The notion follows that if the public are more 
commonly exposed by ideal-type deliberation, then deliberation in the wider public 
sphere may be improved. By this I mean that by exposing the public to the kind of debate 
that takes place in Parliament, they may encounter a type of debate that is not commonly 
seen elsewhere in mainstream media.  
 
 In many Western democracies, for reasons pertaining to the market liberalisation of 
the public sphere, the reporting of Parliament has greatly declined. Detailed accounts of 
debates have all but disappeared from the national press, with some of the only 
parliamentary reporting focusing on the comic, as seen in the work of the sketch writers. 
Moreover, ministers commonly speak to the press before a Parliamentary announcement, 
flouting the clear conventions set out on the matter. There is a need for Parliament to take 
the initiative on the matter, and to improve its own communication; both to the press and 
to the public. Given the system of governance that operates in the UK, with one party 
usually having a massive working majority, it therefore de facto is the responsibility of 
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the government to propose and guide such changes. The Putnam Commission report on 
the UK Parliament, argued that the UK parliaments failure to communicate has lead to 
widespread misunderstanding of Parliamentʼs function and its importance (Hansard 
Society 2005). As Kalitowski argues, “research suggests that most people are not willing 
to pro-actively seek information about Parliament and are almost totally reliant on what 
they see on television or read in the newspapers for information” (Kalitowski 2008, 11). 
Here government can be influential. For example, enacting recommendations that follow 
those set out by the Putnam commission would be exemplary of this. The commission’s 
recommendations suggested that “all of Parliamentʼs communication with the public” be 
driven by the following five principles: “Accessibility and Transparency”; “Participation 
and Responsiveness”; “Accountability with the Public”; “Inclusiveness”; “A model of 
good practice in management and communication” (Hansard Society 2005). These five 
principles may also be extended to communication with journalists, with one way that 
these may be enacted being through broadcasting policies and legislation. In the UK, the 
government can be hugely influential on the content Public Service Broadcasting, 
through the enacting of legislation. Mandating that Parliament is extensively covered by 
broadcast media, can be massively influential over the extent to which the operations of a 
parliament are exposed to the public.  
 
 In the UK, the establishment of the BBC Parliament channel is representative of 
this. Moreover, the recently launched Democracy Live website is a perfect example of 
how PSBs can deliver content in the public sphere that would simply be untenable under 
the market model. Launching in November 2009, Democracy Live offers coverage (live 
of the House of Commons, House of Lords, Welsh Assembly, Northern Irish Assembly, 
Scottish Parliament and the European Parliament. Also, footage from select committees 
from in the Houses of Parliament is carried. Moreover, as all content is searchable, 
Democracy Live thematises footage across its archive. For example, a user may follow 
attention that the issue of “housing” gets in the elected institutions, and view debates that 
has taken place on this theme. Indeed, what the website offers the user is essentially 
unrivaled in terms of what the market could deliver, or indeed what parliament itself 
could deliver. This takes us to a position where the role of Public Service Broadcasting is 
integral to the communication of parliament, and in doing so, the strengthening of the 
public sphere. PSBs, through their vast resources - technical and financial - can offer a 
strategic and comprehensive way to communicate parliament.  
 
 Given the (supposedly) egalitarian nature of public service broadcasting, it is open - 
as in the Habermasian principle - to all people. Through the communication of the affairs 
of parliament, in a largely unmediated manner, the debates that occur in the legislature 
can be exposed to deliberation in the public sphere. There may of course be room for 
greater development and improvement. For example, carrying BBC parliament on DAB 
radio (as once was the case) would open it up to an even wider audience, and make it 
accessible in the places where one can listen to the radio when television viewing is not 
possible. Furthermore, could BBC Parliament become like Democracy Live, where multi-
screen technology would facilitate its multiple streams? However, as there is still much 
digital exclusion online, the BBC must be careful to not develop online ahead of what it 
develops offline, on television and radio. Consequently, government should mandate to 
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Public Service Broadcasters (the BBC) that parliament is extensively communicated 
through television, radio and the Internet. As the reasoning and testing of arguments takes 
place in parliament, with this process widely communicated in the public sphere, then the 
conditions of deliberative democracy may be enhanced, with the public better equipped 
to reach collective judgement.   
 
 
Conclusions: furthering the research to take account of the case of online 
deliberation 
  
  When we consider journalism, government communication, deliberative 
democracy and the public sphere, the role of the Internet becomes an unavoidable 
question. Indeed, we can see a broad narrative in recent literature which takes these 
themes into account, and by weaving them together attempts to deal with the issue of the 
internet, online public spheres and online deliberative democracy. Habermas has himself 
dealt with this issue, arguing largely against the existence of public spheres online, at 
least judged against the standards that he sets out in his normative model (discussed 
extensively above). Stating that the Internet reintroduces “deliberative elements in 
electronic communication”, and “has certainly reactivated the grass-roots of an 
egalitarian public of writers and readers”, he argues that it can only really further the 
democratic cause through its ability to undermine censorship in countries where this is 
readily applied to the media (Habermas 2006, 9). Rather, as the Internet usually is 
colonised by single or special interest groups, insularly focused, and not commonly 
focused on the advancement of public good, the Internet’s role in strengthening the public 
sphere is limited. Moreover, “The Web provides the hardware for the delocalisation of of 
an intensified and accelerated mode of communication, but it can itself do nothing to 
stem the centrifugal tendencies” (2009, 158).  
 
 For Fishkin, the internet offers a means of carrying out deliberative polling, but at a 
reduced cost: “Eventually, Deliberative Polling on the Internet promises great advantages 
in terms of cost and in terms of flexibility in the time required of participants […] 
Internet-based Deliberative Polls offer the promise of greater convenience and continuing 
dialogue” (Fishkin 2009a, 29). However given the digital divide, whereby many remain 
without online access, deliberative polling online is currently problematic. However, he 
concedes that if this issue was overcome, online polling “may eventually surpass the 
face-to-face process. One can only answer this question through further empirical work” 
(Fishkin 2009a, 31). Moreover, Dahlberg (2001), Blumler and Coleman (2001) and Street 
and Wright (2007), attempt to come to terms with issues of government involvement and 
provision, and issues of design in the deliberative process online. Dahlberg argues that 
whilst some government initiatives globally try to institute deliberative models online, 
they very often are reduced to simply following liberal-individualist ideals. Moreover, 
even if governments were to offer deliberatively based online forums, there remains a 
“need for public deliberations independent of administrative power”, an argument which 
follows the classical Habermasian position that the public sphere should normatively 
exist outside of the control and reach of the state (Dahlberg 2001, 621). 
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 Blumler and Coleman take a similar position when they recommend “the creation 
of a new organisation, publicly funded but independent from government, to encourage 
and report upon a wide range of exercises in electronic democracy. Its remit would be “to 
foster new forms of public involvement in civic affairs through interactive and other 
appropriate means” (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 4). Viewing this in rational terms, they 
state “At best, the new media can be said to have a vulnerable potential to improve public 
communications. If they are to be a force for democracy, a policy intervention is required 
that is both visionary and practical” (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 4). Finally, Street and 
Wright see the issue in terms of design in relation to online deliberative spaces, 
suggesting that it is “how discussion is organized within the medium of communication 
helps to determine whether or not the result will be deliberation or cacophony” (Street 
and Wright 2007, 850). 
 
 This article has contended that the normative theory of the public sphere offers a 
sound position from which to make arguments on deliberative democracy, government 
communication and journalism. It has shown that a certain type of government 
communication - independently regulated - to journalists and to the public, might 
strengthen deliberative democracy within the public sphere. By addressing government 
communication under the categories of the pooling of knowledge, exposing one 
sidedness, and the enhancement of collective judgement, normative arguments can be 
made for a certain type of government communication. The twin theories of deliberative 
democracy and the Habermasian model of the public sphere allow for the making of 
arguments that could have tangible impacts upon government communication in the 
future. With regards to the UK, I have shown that some recent initiatives and 
developments in government communication have begun to move towards a position 
whereby - within the framework of this argument - deliberative democracy might begin 
to be improved. Whilst these arguments primarily relate to the UK, they are also 
generalisable into other western liberal democratic settings. They may not be relevant 
elsewhere, as many other countries already have made significant improvements in this 
area. However, the normative principles on government communication that we can draw 
from public sphere theory, with respect to deliberative democracy, have importance that 
means they ought to apply in multiple settings.  
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i Habermas (1992) accepted that the public sphere was best conceptualized in the plural. Moreover, in 
Between Facts and Norms he argued that the public sphere “branches out into a multitude of overlapping 
international, national, regional, local and subcultural arenas” (Habermas 1996, 373). Positing the existence 
of literary, religious and feminist spheres for example, Habermas states that these make up a panoply of 
“abstract public sphere[s] of isolated readers, listeners and viewers scattered across large geographic areas, 
or even around the globe, and brought together only through the mass media” (Habermas 1996, 374). 
